In this book, Christopher Evan Franklin develops and defends a novel version of event-causal libertarianism. This view is a combination of libertarianism--the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the causal upshots of nondeterministic processes--and agency reductionism--the view that the causal role of the agent in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agent. Franklin boldly counteracts a dominant theory that has similar aims, put forth by well-known philosopher Robert Kane. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable kind of freedom and responsibility. To Franklin, this position is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains: toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. Crucially, if this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.

This book argues that political libertarianism can be grounded in widely shared, everyday moral beliefs--particularly in strictures against shifting our burdens onto others. It also seeks to connect these philosophical arguments with related work in economics, history, and politics for a wide-ranging discussion of political economy.

In this book, Christopher Evan Franklin develops and defends a novel version of event-causal libertarianism. This view is a combination of libertarianism--the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the causal upshots of nondeterministic processes--and agency reductionism--the view that the causal role of the agent in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agent. Franklin boldly counteracts a dominant theory that has similar aims, put forth by well-known philosopher Robert Kane. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable kind of freedom and responsibility. To Franklin, this position is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains: toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. Crucially, if this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.

Political philosophy is dominated by a myth, the myth of the necessity of the state. The state is considered necessary for the provision of many things, but primarily for peace and security. In this provocative book, Gerard Casey argues that social order can be spontaneously generated, that such spontaneous order is the norm in human society and that deviations from the ordered norms can be dealt with without recourse to the coercive power of the state. Casey presents a novel perspective on political philosophy, arguing against the conventional political philosophy pieties and defending a specific political position, which he identifies as 'libertarian anarchy'. The book includes a history of the concept of anarchy, an examination of the possibility of anarchic societies and an articulation of the nature of law and order within such societies. Casey presents his specific form of anarchy, undergirded by a theory of human action that prioritises liberty, as a philosophically and politically viable alternative to the standard positions in political theory.

Libertarianism isn’t about winning elections; it is first and foremost a political philosophy—a description of how, in the opinion of libertarians, free people ought to treat one another, at least when they use the law, which they regard as potentially dangerous. If libertarians are correct, the law should intrude into people’s lives as little as possible, rarely telling them what to do or how to live. A political and economic philosophy as old as John Locke and John Stuart Mill, but as alive and timely as Rand Paul, the Tea Party, and the novels of Ayn Rand, libertarianism emphasizes individual rights and calls for a radical reduction in the power and size of government. Libertarianism For Beginners lays out the history and principles of this often-misunderstood philosophy in lucid, dispassionate terms that help illuminate today’s political dialogue.

Libertarianism: For and Against offers dueling perspectives on the scope of legitimate government. Tibor R. Machan, a well-known political philosopher with libertarian convictions, argues for a minimal government devoted solely to protecting individual rights to life, liberty, and property. Stressing the sovereignty of each individual, Machan argues in favor of limiting democracy's scope and against the redistribution of wealth, or any other sort of taxation. In opposition to libertarianism, philosopher Craig Duncan defends democratic liberalism, which aims to ensure that all citizens have fair access to a life of dignity. This requires measures to protect equality of opportunity, as well as measures to ensure all have access to a decent minimum standard of living. In a dynamic exchange of arguments, critiques, and rebuttals, the two philosophers cut to the heart of this important debate, articulating and defending competing conceptions of such core values as political freedom and equality.

Elaborating on and defending a rigorous, rights-based libertarianism, Mark D. Friedman here develops the seminal ideas articulated by Robert Nozick in his landmark work Anarchy, State and Utopia. Consolidating more than three decades of scholarly and popular writing to have emerged in the wake of Nozick's text, Friedman offers a 21st century defense of the minimal libertarian state. In the course of this analysis, and drawing on further insights offered by the work of F.A. Hayek, Nozick's Libertarian Project shows that natural rights libertarianism can offer convincing answers to the fundamental questions that lie at the heart of political theory. The book also rebuts many of the most common criticisms to have been levelled at this worldview, including those from left libertarians and from egalitarians such as as G.A. Cohen.