This is the last volume of his monumental chronicle. The author examines the cavalry's role in trench warfare and shows how at the worst crisis moments, the cavalry's superior mobility saved the day.

A prevalent view among historians is that both horsed cavalry and the cavalry charge became obviously obsolete in the second half of the nineteenth century in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower, and that officers of the cavalry clung to both for reasons of prestige and stupidity. It is this view, commonly held but rarely supported by sustained research, that this book challenges. It shows that the achievements of British and Empire cavalry in the First World War, although controversial, are sufficient to contradict the argument that belief in the cavalry was evidence of military incompetence. It offers a case study of how in reality a practical military doctrine for the cavalry was developed and modified over several decades, influenced by wider defence plans and spending, by the experience of combat, by Army politics, and by the rivalries of senior officers. Debate as to how the cavalry was to adjust its tactics in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower began in the mid nineteenth century, when the increasing size of armies meant a greater need for mobile troops. The cavalry problem was how to deal with a gap in the evolution of warfare between the mass armies of the later nineteenth century and the motorised firepower of the mid twentieth century, an issue that is closely connected with the origins of the deadlock on the Western Front. Tracing this debate, this book shows how, despite serious attempts to ’learn from history’, both European-style wars and colonial wars produced ambiguous or disputed evidence as to the future of cavalry, and doctrine was largely a matter of what appeared practical at the time.

In the seventh, and second last, volume in t his historical work, Lord Anglesey shows how superior the Br itish cavalry was compared to those of the French and German s. He concentrates on the first five months of the War. '

At its dawn in the early twentieth century, the new technology of aviation posed a crucial question to American and British cavalry: what do we do with the airplane? Lacking the hindsight of historical perspective, cavalry planners based their decisions on incomplete information. Harnessing the Airplane compares how the American and British armies dealt with this unique challenge. A multilayered look at a critical aspect of modern industrial warfare, this book examines the ramifications of technological innovation and its role in the fraught relationship that developed between traditional ground units and emerging air forces. Cavalry officers pondered the potential military uses of airplanes and other new technologies early on, but preferred to test them before embracing and incorporating them in their operations. Cavalrymen cautiously examined airplane capabilities, developed applications and doctrine for joint operations, and in the United States, even tried to develop their own, specially designed craft. Throughout the interwar period, instead of replacing the cavalry, airplanes were used cooperatively with cavalry forces in reconnaissance, security, communication, protection, and pursuit—a collaboration tested in maneuvers and officially blessed in both British and American doctrine. This interdependent relationship changed drastically, however, during the 1930s as aviation priorities and doctrine shifted from tactical support of ground troops toward independent strategic bombardment. Henning shows that the American and British experiences with military aviation differed. The nascent British aviation service made quicker inroads into reconnaissance and scouting, even though the British cavalry was the older institution with more-established traditions. The American cavalry, despite its youth, contested the control of reconnaissance as late as the 1930s, years after similar arguments ended in Britain. Drawing on contemporary government reports, memoirs and journals of service personnel, books, and professional and trade journals and magazines, Harnessing the Airplane is a nuanced account of the cavalry’s response to aviation over time and presents a new perspective on a significant chapter of twentieth-century military history.

This revised edition of Mike Chappell's original Men-at-Arms 138 represents nearly 20 years' new research. It covers the saddlery, horse furniture, and personal equipment of the British horsed cavalryman from the early stages of the Napoleonic Wars until the final disappearance of the mounted arm during World War II. Such details are essential for an understanding of how cavalry fought in the 19th and early 20th centuries, since the design of equipment was intimately connected with cavalry tactics in any particular period. Students of campaign history, and particularly modellers, will find here a mass of specific information, illustrated with photographs, diagrams, drawings and full colour plates.

Nine Historians and Writers Investigate the Role of Cavalry in the War for Independence.