U.S. Army aviation expanded dramatically in both size and breadth of activities after its inception in 1942, but much of its post-World War II history, particularly after the establishment of the Air Force as an independent service by the national Security Act of 1947, has been relatively neglected. Despite a certain amount of jockeying for position by both services, particularly in the early years after their separation, the Army was able to carve out a clear transport and operational combat role for its own air arm. "A History of Army Aviation - 1950-1962" examines the development of the Army's air wing, especially for air support of ground troops, both in terms of organization and in relation to the ongoing friction with the Air Force. After describing the rapid expansion of purely Army air power after 1950 and the accompanying expansion of aviation training, the book delves into the reorganization of aviation activities within a Directorate of Army Aviation. It also provides a valuable account of the successful development of aircraft armament, perhaps the most significant advance of this period. In particular, intensive experimentation at the Army Aviation School led to several practical weapons systems and helped to prove that weapons could be fired from rotary aircraft. This arming of the helicopter was to have a profound effect on both Army organization and combat doctrine, culminating in official approval of the armed helicopter by the Department of the Army in 1960. "A History of Army Aviation - 1950-1962" also explores the development of new aircraft between 1955 and 1962, including the UH-1 medical evacuation, transport, and gunship helicopter and the HC-1 cargo copter. In addition, the book discusses the Berlin Crisis of 1961 as an impetus for immediate and unexpected expansion of army aviation, quickly followed by the beginnings of intervention in Vietnam by the end of 1962.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.

Except in a few instances, since World War II no American soldier or sailor has been attacked by enemy air power. Conversely, no enemy soldier orsailor has acted in combat without being attacked or at least threatened by American air power. Aviators have brought the air weapon to bear against enemies while denying them the same prerogative. This is the legacy of the U.S. AirForce, purchased at great cost in both human and material resources.More often than not, aerial pioneers had to fight technological ignorance, bureaucratic opposition, public apathy, and disagreement over purpose.Every step in the evolution of air power led into new and untrodden territory, driven by humanitarian impulses; by the search for higher, faster, and farther flight; or by the conviction that the air way was the best way. Warriors have always coveted the high ground. If technology permitted them to reach it, men, women andan air force held and exploited it-from Thomas Selfridge, first among so many who gave that "last full measure of devotion"; to Women's Airforce Service Pilot Ann Baumgartner, who broke social barriers to become the first Americanwoman to pilot a jet; to Benjamin Davis, who broke racial barriers to become the first African American to command a flying group; to Chuck Yeager, a one-time non-commissioned flight officer who was the first to exceed the speed of sound; to John Levitow, who earned the Medal of Honor by throwing himself over a live flare to save his gunship crew; to John Warden, who began a revolution in air power thought and strategy that was put to spectacular use in the Gulf War.Industrialization has brought total war and air power has brought the means to overfly an enemy's defenses and attack its sources of power directly. Americans have perceived air power from the start as a more efficient means of waging war and as a symbol of the nation's commitment to technology to master challenges, minimize casualties, and defeat adversaries.