"Overall, the book is organized by topic, including business, politics, education, religion, the arts, transportation, and the press. Cole shows how Columbus residents reacted to and reflected the major political, economic, and social trends in the United States at the time. In contrast to earlier accounts that focused primarily on the male, white leadership, this book tries to encompass all economic classes and ethnic and racial groups.".

Fragile Finance examines financial crisis in the era of global credit. Drawing on the work of Hyman Minsky, the book discusses the global financial system over the past decade, suggesting that financial fragility stems from an explosive combination of financial innovation, over-borrowing, and progressive illiquidity of financial structures.

How to prevent runs on open-end mutual funds? In recent years, markets have observed an innovation that changed the way open-end funds are priced. Alternative pricing rules (known as swing pricing) adjust funds’ net asset values to pass on funds’ trading costs to transacting shareholders. Using unique data on investor transactions in U.K. corporate bond funds, we show that swing pricing eliminates the first-mover advantage arising from the traditional pricing rule and significantly reduces redemptions during stress periods. The positive impact of alternative pricing rules on fund flows reverses in calm periods when costs associated with higher tracking error dominate the pricing effect.

An authoritative guide to the new economics of our crisis-filled century. Published in collaboration with the Institute for New Economic Thinking. The 2008 financial crisis was a seismic event that laid bare how financial institutions’ instabilities can have devastating effects on societies and economies. COVID-19 brought similar financial devastation at the beginning of 2020 and once more massive interventions by central banks were needed to heed off the collapse of the financial system. All of which begs the question: why is our financial system so fragile and vulnerable that it needs government support so often? For a generation of economists who have risen to prominence since 2008, these events have defined not only how they view financial instability, but financial markets more broadly. Leveraged brings together these voices to take stock of what we have learned about the costs and causes of financial fragility and to offer a new canonical framework for understanding it. Their message: the origins of financial instability in modern economies run deeper than the technical debates around banking regulation, countercyclical capital buffers, or living wills for financial institutions. Leveraged offers a fundamentally new picture of how financial institutions and societies coexist, for better or worse. The essays here mark a new starting point for research in financial economics. As we muddle through the effects of a second financial crisis in this young century, Leveraged provides a road map and a research agenda for the future.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

Capital flows to the developing economies have long displayed a boom-and-bust pattern. However, rarely has the cycle turned as abruptly as it did in the 1990s, when the surges in lending were followed by the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95, and the sudden collapse of currencies in Asia in 1997 and 1998. The volume maps an uncertain financial landscape in which volatile private capital flows and fragile banking systems produce sudden reversals of fortune for governments and economies. This environment creates dilemmas for both national policy-makers who confront the mixed blessing of capital inflows and the international institutions that manage the recurrent crises.

During a financial crisis, when markets most need liquidity and arbitrage tradings, hedge funds often reduce their exposures and positions. The paper explains this phenomenon in light of coordination risk. We argue that the fragile nature of capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, introduces coordination risk to hedge fund's investors. Coordination risk effectively limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation with coordination risk. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even give up participating in the market when they factor coordination risk into their investment decisions. The model gives a new explanation to the limits to arbitrage. We also discuss other implications of the model.