This paper develops a dynamic theory of war and peace. In our framework, an aggressive country can forcibly extract concessions from a non-aggressive country via war. Alternatively, it can avoid war and allow the non-aggressive country to make concessions on its own. Both countries suffer from limited commitment, and under peace, the non-aggressive country may receive a private shock which deems concessions too costly. We show that the realization of war sustains concessions along the equilibrium path. In the efficient sequential equilibrium, the aggressive country punishes failed concessions by requesting larger and larger concessions, and their failure eventually leads to a war which can be temporary. After a temporary war, the aggressive country forgives the non-aggressive country by re-engaging in peace because of the coarseness of public information. In the long run, temporary wars can be sustained only if countries are patient, if the cost of war is large, and if the cost of concessions is low. Otherwise, the aggressive country cannot continue to forgive the non-aggressive country, and countries converge to total war (permanent war).

New approaches to understanding war and peace in the changing international system. What causes war? How can wars be prevented? Scholars and policymakers have sought the answers to these questions for centuries. Although wars continue to occur, recent scholarship has made progress toward developing more sophisticated and perhaps more useful theories on the causes and prevention of war. This volume includes essays by leading scholars on contemporary approaches to understanding war and peace. The essays include expositions, analyses, and critiques of some of the more prominent and enduring explanations of war. Several authors discuss realist theories of war, which focus on the distribution of power and the potential for offensive war. Others examine the prominent hypothesis that the spread of democracy will usher in an era of peace. In light of the apparent increase in nationalism and ethnic conflict, several authors present hypotheses on how nationalism causes war and how such wars can be controlled. Contributors also engage in a vigorous debate on whether international institutions can promote peace. In a section on war and peace in the changing international system, several authors consider whether rising levels of international economic independence and environmental scarcity will influence the likelihood of war.

“If you want peace, prepare for war.” “A buildup of offensive weapons can be purely defensive.” “The worst road may be the best route to battle.” Strategy is made of such seemingly self-contradictory propositions, Edward Luttwak shows—they exemplify the paradoxical logic that pervades the entire realm of conflict.In this widely acclaimed work, now revised and expanded, Luttwak unveils the peculiar logic of strategy level by level, from grand strategy down to combat tactics. Having participated in its planning, Luttwak examines the role of air power in the 1991 Gulf War, then detects the emergence of “post-heroic” war in Kosovo in 1999—an American war in which not a single American soldier was killed.In the tradition of Carl von Clausewitz, Strategy goes beyond paradox to expose the dynamics of reversal at work in the crucible of conflict. As victory is turned into defeat by over-extension, as war brings peace by exhaustion, ordinary linear logic is overthrown. Citing examples from ancient Rome to our own days, from Barbarossa and Pearl Harbor down to minor combat affrays, from the strategy of peace to the latest operational methods of war, this book by one of the world’s foremost authorities reveals the ultimate logic of military failure and success, of war and peace.

Argues that the key to the formation of an empire lies in a society's capacity for collective action, resulting from people banding together to confront a common enemy, and describing how the growth of empires leads to a growing dichotomy between rich and poor, increasing conflict instead of cooperation, and inevitable dissolution. Reprint. 25,000 first printing.

Chapter Introduction: Strategic history -- chapter 1 Themes and contexts of strategic history -- chapter 2 Carl von Clausewitz and the theory of war -- chapter 3 From limited war to national war: The French Revolution and the Napoleonic way of war -- chapter 4 The nineteenth century, I: A strategic view -- chapter 5 The nineteenth century, II: Technology, warfare and international order -- chapter 6 World War I, I: Controversies -- chapter 7 World War I, II: Modern warfare -- chapter 8 The twenty-year armistice, 1919-39 -- chapter 9 The mechanization of war -- chapter 10 World War II in Europe, I: The structure and course of total war -- chapter 11 World War II in Europe, II: Understanding the war -- chapter 12 World War II in Asia-Pacific, I: Japan and the politics of empire -- chapter 13 World War II in Asia-Pacific, II: Strategy and warfare -- chapter 14 The Cold War, I: Politics and ideology -- chapter 15 The Cold War, II: The nuclear revolution -- chapter 16 War and peace after the Cold War: An interwar decade -- chapter 17 9/11 and the age of terror -- chapter 18 Irregular warfare: Guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists -- chapter 19 War, peace and international order -- chapter 20 Conclusion: Must future strategic history resemble the past?.

Reviewing, comparing, and contrasting models of foreign policy, this volume focuses on the cognitive vs rational debate about decisionmaking on war and peace. It provides alternative models of foreign policy choice and identifies when one strategy is more appropriate than another.