Intellectual property (IP) law operates with the ontological assumption that immaterial goods such as works, inventions, and designs exist, and that these abstract types can be owned like a piece of land. Alexander Peukert provides a comprehensive critique of this paradigm, showing that the abstract IP object is a speech-based construct, which first crystalised in the eighteenth century. He highlights the theoretical flaws of metaphysical object ontology and introduces John Searle's social ontology as a more plausible approach to the subject matter of IP. On this basis, he proposes an IP theory under which IP rights provide their holders with an exclusive privilege to use reproducible 'Master Artefacts.' Such a legal-realist IP theory, Peukert argues, is both descriptively and prescriptively superior to the prevailing paradigm of the abstract IP object. This work was originally published in German and was translated by Gill Mertens.

Are intellectual property rights like other property rights? More and more of the world’s knowledge and information is under the control of intellectual property owners. What are the justifications for this? What are the implications for power and for justice of allowing this property form to range across social life? Can we look to traditional property theory to supply the answers or do we need a new approach? Intellectual property rights relate to abstract objects - objects like algorithms and DNA sequences. The consequences of creating property rights in such objects are far reaching. A Philosophy of Intellectual Property argues that lying at the heart of intellectual property are duty-bearing privileges. We should adopt an instrumentalist approach to intellectual property and reject a proprietarian approach - an approach which emphasizes the connection between labour and property rights. The analysis draws on the history of intellectual property, legal materials, the work of Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Marx and Hegel, as well as economic, sociological and legal theory. The book is designed to be accessible to specialists in a number of fields as well as students. It will interest philosophers, political scientists, economists, legal scholars as well as those professionals concerned with policy issues raised by modern technologies and the information society.

This work is an examination of how intellectual property laws should be applied to cyberspace, software and other computer-mediated creations.

What is "information"? It this question answerable? Why should intellectual property scholars bother conceptualizing information? We are told that we live in the technological age, in which information is a prime resource. In turn, intellectual property [IP] regulation directly relates to this resource. Most IP scholars would probably agree that their respective disciplines concern property-like entitlements with respect to "information." Information is the subject matter around which IP laws tailor exclusory regimes. In this light, the thinness of the theoretical discussion about IP subject matter as information is quite striking. In contrast to the prevailing tendency refraining from defining information, this paper asserts that defining information - in the specific context of IP law - is both feasible and beneficial. Pondering the concept of information (and the nature of IP subject matter as information) illuminates nonobvious aspects of both theoretical and practical issues. Borrowing insights from information and communication theories, the paper constructs a framework that conceives information as a meta-concept. Accordingly, information is a significantly unpredictable and ubiquitous dynamism, in which medial messages are being constantly created, delivered, processed, modified, changed and exchanged. Messages are the objectively detectable apparitions of that process. For analytical purposes, I propose that the information process can be broken down to atomic sequences of communication events. Each singular sequence involves a medial message passed from an originator to a recipient. The medial message, the essence of IP subject matter, fulfills two quasi-formal requirements: It must be both perceptible and comprehensible. After presenting the original model and its definitions, I turn to apply it to copyright law. By referring to U.S. and occasionally also to foreign law, the paper demonstrates how the model can describe and explain basic copyright concepts and principles. The paper further shows how information model perspectives can throw new light on legal analysis of concrete problems, for instance, the questions of authorship and originality. I argue further that the policy debate surrounding IP law can benefit from a robust theoretical conversation geared toward a more solid understanding of "information." The information model introduced in this paper hopes to furnish some initial insights in this direction.

Fourteen philosophers, economists and legal scholars address the question 'Can intellectual property rights be fair?' What differentiates intellectual from real property? Should libertarians or Rawlsians defend IP rights? What's wrong with free-riding? How can incentives be taken into account by theories of justice?

The book is well provided with detailed references/bibliography for those who want to pursue the matter. . . The authors have effected a very thorough analysis of the moral issues and the book is strongly recommended for that reason. . . Brian Spear, World Patent Information This book should change the contours of the intellectual property debate. Spinello and Bottis fully appreciate what the standard instrumentalist accounts of intellectual property cannot even acknowledge that the lives and liberty of creators and artists are not the common property of society, and that it is intrinsically wrong to treat the efforts and projects of individuals as if they were unowned resources reaped as the fruit of the earth. Their work should help to reorient discussion of IP from an excessive concern with the economic and social consequences of competing policies back to the bedrock issues of basic respect for the integrity of our various particular lives and the labor that constitutes those lives. At the same time, they studiously avoid the unserious extremism that characterizes so much of the debate on every side, recognizing that respecting the lives and liberty of all sets real boundaries on the proper scope and stringency of IP claims, ruling out overzealous enforcement and radical repudiation alike. Richard Volkman, Southern Connecticut State University and Research Center on Computing and Society, US Since the rise of the Internet the question of intellectual property has been and still is one of the most controversial societal and ethical issues. The new global, interactive and bottom-up medium challenges moral, legal and economic structures not only in the music and film industry but also in the field of knowledge production, storage, distribution and access. The academic debate soon became and is still polarized between critics and defenders of IPR. The book by Richard A. Spinello and Maria Bottis A Defense of Intellectual Property Rights analyses in a critical and comprehensive manner some of the dogmas widely spread by the critics of IPR paying special attention to the differences between EU and European legal regimes. The authors explore the foundations of IP in Lockean philosophy, as a representative of a natural law approach, as well as in the theories of Fichte and Hegel based on deontological arguments. Both perspectives prevail in European law while American property law is widely based on utilitarian arguments. The authors argue in favor of Lockean and Hegelian foundations showing their relevance in the present debate as well as calling the attention to the link between these theories and the Catholic social doctrine. The book is an important contribution to this ongoing debate. Rafael Capurro, Stuttgart Media University, Germany Richard A. Spinello and Maria Bottis defend the thesis that intellectual property rights are justified on non-economic grounds. The rationale for this moral justification is primarily inspired by the theory of John Locke. In the process of defending Locke, the authors confront the deconstructionist critique of intellectual property rights and remove the major barriers interfering with a proper understanding of authorial entitlement. The book also familiarizes the reader with the rich historical and legal tradition behind intellectual property protection.