This book aims to widen the understanding of stochastic dynamic choice and equilibrium models. It offers a simplified and heuristic exposition of the theory of Brownian motion and its control or regulation, rendering such methods more accessible to economists who do not require a detailed, mathematical treatment of the subject. The main mathematical ideas are presented in a context which with which economists will be familiar. Using a binomial approach to Brownian motion, the mathematics is reduced to simple algebra, progressing to some equally simple limits. The starting point of the calculus of Brownian motion - 'Ito's Lemma' - emerges by analogy with the economics of risk-aversion. Conditions for the optimal regulation of Brownian motion, including the important, but often mysterious, 'smooth pasting' condition, are derived in a similar way. Each theoretical derivation is illustrated by developing a significant economic application, drawn mainly from recent research in macroeconomics and international economics.

This book aims to widen the understanding of stochastic dynamic choice and equilibrium models. It offers a simplified and heuristic exposition of the theory of Brownian motion and its control or regulation, rendering such methods more accessible to economists who do not require a detailed, mathematical treatment of the subject. The main mathematical ideas are presented in a context which with which economists will be familiar. Using a binomial approach to Brownian motion, the mathematics is reduced to simple algebra, progressing to some equally simple limits. The starting point of the calculus of Brownian motion - 'Ito's Lemma' - emerges by analogy with the economics of risk-aversion. Conditions for the optimal regulation of Brownian motion, including the important, but often mysterious, 'smooth pasting' condition, are derived in a similar way. Each theoretical derivation is illustrated by developing a significant economic application, drawn mainly from recent research in macroeconomics and international economics.

The implementation problem lies at the heart of a theory of institutions. Simply stated, the aim of implementation theory is to investigate in a rigorous way the relationships between outcomes in a society and how those outcomes arise. The first part of "Bayesian Implementation" presents a basic model of the Bayesian implementation problem and summarizes and explains recent developments in this branch of implementation theory. Substantive problems of interest such as public goods provision, auctions and bargaining are special cases of the model, and these are addressed in subsequent chapters.