This paper argues that the American "open-fields" doctrine should not be imported into Canada. That doctrine holds that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the area beyond the curtilage surrounding a home and therefore searches of such "open-fields" do not engage constitutional safeguards, such as the warrant requirement. In making the case that the open-fields doctrine should be rejected by Canadian courts, the paper canvasses the differences between American and Canadian constitutional jurisprudence relating to the definition of reasonable privacy expectations under the constitutional guarantees relating to the protection of privacy in both the American Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The paper argues that a key difference is the rejection of a "risk-analysis" approach to the definition of reasonable privacy expectations in Canada. That difference, explains the author, is the principal reason why the open-fields doctrine should find no place in section 8 Charter jurisprudence. The open-fields exception to the warrant requirement is all about misguided and illogical risk-reasoning, which the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently and clearly rejected.

In 1984, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Hunter v Southam, declared warrantless searches unreasonable under section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Police would henceforth require authorization based on “reasonable and probable grounds.” The decision promised to protect individuals from state power, but as Richard Jochelson and David Ireland argue, post-Hunter search and seizure law took a turn away from the landmark decision. An examination of dozens of post-Hunter cases reveals that Justice Dickson’s vision has been diminished in an era of heightened security and expanding police powers.

In the 1970s, the Supreme Court handed down Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller, two of the most important Fourth Amendment decisions of the 20th century. In these cases, the Court held that people are not entitled to an expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily provide to third parties. This legal proposition, known as the third-party doctrine, permits the government access to, as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, a vast amount of information about individuals, such as the websites they visit; who they have emailed; the phone numbers they dial; and their utility, banking, and education records, just to name a few. Questions have been raised whether this doctrine is still viable in light of the major technological and social changes over the past several decades.

"The fifth edition had to be substantially revised to reflect the impact of recent Supreme Court of Canada bellweather decisions in Grant and the companion decisions in Harrison and Suberu. These decisions require a new approach to the meaning of detention for Charter purposes and to the remedy of exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter. Much of the voluminous prior jurisprudence on section 24(2) over the past 27 years relating to the meaning and consequences of conscripting the accused in violation of the Charter is now of little moment. New clarifications and new questions are identified."--Pub. desc.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.