The potentially anticompetitive effects of common ownership are being discussed controversially. While the US agencies still display reluctance, the Commission has already invoked common ownership has part of a theory of harm in Dow/DuPont and Bayer/Monsanto. In our paper we focus on how common ownership can bear on the application of price pressure indices in unilateral effects analysis of horizontal mergers between portfolio companies. We do not assess whether the underlying premise of common ownership to lead to an internalization of shareholders' expectations of high overall market returns is convincing. Rather, we hypothesize such common shareholder influence. Our main conclusion is that common ownership should still not be considered a general circumstantial factor indicating competitive harm with respect to post-merger price increases or effects on innovation competition. Rather, it calls for case-by-case analysis.

This incisive Research Handbook identifies and assesses the emerging trends in competition enforcement, investigating how such changes impact the enforcement approach of competition authorities and the behaviour of companies in an ever-evolving business and regulatory environment.

Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.

This volume offers contributions to questions relating to the economics of innovation and technological change. Central to the development of new technologies are institutional environments and among the topics discussed are the roles played by universities and the ways in which the allocation of funds affects innovation.

The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

Determinants of firm and market organization; Analysis of market behavior; Empirical methods and results; International issues and comparision; government intervention in the Marketplace.

Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.