From their beginnings in the mid-nineteenth century through the 1980's, political parties in Chile have displayed three discrete ideological tendencies, with two at opposite ends of the political spectrum and at least one in the center. This tripartite distribution made Chile's party system unlike any other in Latin America. How did Chile's distinctive system evolve? This book finds the answer in how three basic social cleavages--religious, urban, and rural--became polarized at three periods of critical juncture. Clerical-anticlerical conflict gave initial definition to the party system in the period 1857-61, and continued to shape the political arena long after specific issues had receded into the background. Then, between 1920 and 1932, class conflict in the urban and mining enclave sectors forced party elites to respond to the demands of leaders of middle-sector and working groups for increased political and social power. This was the second of what the author calls Chile's critical junctures for party formation. The third, occurring in the period 1952-58, saw the spread of working-class politics into the countryside. Crucial here was a shift in the position of the Catholic Church on class conflict, resulting in the emergence of an important Church-inspired center party. The book compares the behavior of the political center during the three historical periods and suggests a conceptual framework for understanding different types of center parties. The author also addresses certain questions raised by the emergence and behavior of center parties: What were the implications of the presence of a center party for the patterns of party competition? Why did the center emerge and re-emerge at each critical point in the evolution of Chile's party system? Can this be understood in terms of an underlying coalitional logic, or are factors such as leadership, political choice, and historical accident more useful explanations? Consistent with this focus on the center is a new account of the key role of the Christian Democrats in the reconstitution of party competition in the late 1980's and early 1990's. The author concludes by offering some observations on the probable shape of party politics--and the role of the political center within it--in tomorrow's Chile.

This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.