Edgeworth's paradox of taxation occurs when an increase in the unit cost of a product causes a multiproduct monopolist to reduce prices. We give simple illustrations of the paradox, including how it can arise with uniform pricing. We then give a general analysis of the case of linear marginal cost and demand conditions, showing how the matrix of cost passthrough terms is similar to a positive definite matrix, and so has positive eigenvalues. When the firm supplies two substitute products we show how Edgeworth's paradox always occurs with a suitable choice of cost function. We then establish a connection between Ramsey pricing and the paradox in a form relating to consumer surplus, and use it to find further examples where consumer surplus increases with cost.

The standard partial equilibrium formula for pass-through substantially mismeasures incidence in the presence of demand or supply interdependencies. We study general equilibrium tax incidence in a perfectly competitive, multiproduct setting. If only one product is taxed, the general equilibrium incidence will always be greater on the consumer than suggested by the standard incidence formula. If the tax changes on multiple related commodities, while maintaining perfect competition, a necessary condition for overshifting is that the related commodities are substitutes. Pass-through greater than one-hundred percent is not sufficient to infer market structure. When empirically estimating pass-through, pass-through estimates capture the direct effect of the tax on the market, the indirect feedback effects resulting from price and tax changes in other markets and taxation of inputs to production. Empirically applying our theory to estimate pass-through in alcohol markets, we show that demand interdependencies and simultaneous tax changes on related products are important.

This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the heterogeneous response of exporters to real exchange rate fluctuations due to product quality. Our model shows that the elasticity of demand perceived by exporters decreases with a real depreciation and with quality, leading to more pricing-to-market and to a smaller response of export volumes to a real depreciation for higher quality goods. We test the proposed theory using a highly disaggregated Argentinean firm-level wine export dataset between 2002 and 2009 combined with experts wine rankings as a measure of quality. The model predictions find strong support in the data and the results are robust to different measures of quality, samples, specifications, and to the potential endogeneity of quality.

Tackles the important issue of how to regulate firms with market power.

Product scope adjustment is a key mechanism through which multi-product firms achieve efficient resource allocations. In this paper, we take a novel perspective to study firms’ product scope adjustment behavior through the lens of asset pricing. Using a unique panel scanner data set containing detailed information on products, matched with the financial information of their manufacturers, we find that multi-product firms with higher product turnover have lower financial risks and lower risk premia. To understand this channel, we propose a stylized model with a time-dependent (Calvo-type) product turnover rate to highlight the ’risk absorption channel’ of product scope adjustment. In response to an economy-wide shock, a firm that can adjust its product scope more flexibly shows lower excess equity returns and lower asset volatility.

Doctoral Thesis / Dissertation from the year 2011 in the subject Economics - Macro-economics, general, European Business School - International University Schlo Reichartshausen Oestrich-Winkel (Department of Governance and Economics), language: English, abstract: This thesis strives to offer new insights in two main areas. First, it investigates the fact that merchant usage fees for payment card services differ substantially among merchant sectors. Second, it identifies the smart (electricity) meter market as a multi-sided market and applies the insights found in the literature to better regulate a market-driven rollout of smart meters. Chapter 2 examines the determination of the merchant usage fee of a monopolistic unitary payment card network based on the characteristics of the downstream market. Merchants engage in Bertrand competition that allows for an observation of heterogeneous products. My coauthor and I find that the payment card network extracts a part of the economic rent that merchants obtain. The rent, and consequently the merchant usage fee, is increasing in the downstream market size, but decreasing in the price elasticity of consumer demand, as well as in the substitutability of products, and in the fraction of consumers who prefer card payments. Chapter 3 undertakes a similar analysis for Cournot competition among merchants. The merchant usage fee is decreasing in terms of the price elasticity of demand and has an inverse V relationship with regard to the fraction of card users. At first, increasing the fraction of cardholders makes accepting cards more attractive for merchants because of the increased sales. At some point, however, the higher costs of handling card transactions outweighs the benefit of increased revenue. Further, card companies can increase profits by influencing consumers to use their cards in sectors with a low price elasticity of demand where they can then tax a merchant's profits more heavily. Chapter 4 looks at smart mete