We address a generic price competition model in an industry with an arbitrary number of competitors, each offering all or a subset of a given line of N products. The products are substitutes in the sense that the demand volume of each product weakly increases whenever the price of another product increases. The cost structure is linear, with arbitrary cost rates.Our demand model is the unique regular extension of a set of demand functions that are affine in a limited polyhedral subset of the price space. A set of demand functions is regular if it satisfies the following conditions: under any given price vector, when some product is priced out of the market, i.e., has zero demand, any increase of its price has no impact on the demand volumes. Depending on the set of prices selected by the competing firms, a different product assortment is offered on the market.We characterize the equilibrium prices, product assortment and sales volumes in the price competition model, under this demand model. Under minimal conditions, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium always exists; while multiple price equilibria may arise, they are equivalent in the sense of generating an identical product assortment and sales volumes.

The role of assortment planning and pricing in shaping sales and profits of retailers is well documented and studied in monopolistic settings. However, such a role remains relatively unexplored in competitive environments. In this paper, we study equilibrium behavior of competing retailers in two settings: i.) when prices are exogenously fixed, and retailers compete in assortments only; and ii.) when retailers compete jointly in assortment and prices. For this, we model consumer choice using a multinomial Logit, and assume that each retailer selects products from a predefined set, and faces a display constraint. We show that when the sets of products available to retailers do not overlap, there always exists one equilibrium that pareto-dominates all others, and that such an outcome can be reached through an iterative process of best responses. A direct corollary of our results is that competition leads a firm to offer a broader set of products compared to when it is operating as a monopolist, and to broader offerings in the market compared to a centralized planner. When some products are available to all retailers, i.e., assortments might overlap, we show that display constraints drive equilibrium existence properties.

For many products, consumers may need to physically experience them in order to assess their own valuations. We consider how such uncertainty can affect the equilibrium pricing and assortment choices among competing retailers. Specifically, we consider a market that consists of two retailers with identical cost structures and two products with symmetric underlying demand. We characterize the pricing equilibria for each possible set of assortments based on how consumers optimally search for products in response to observed prices and assortments, and show how the structure of a retailer's inter-temporal pricing pattern (EDLP or HLP) should depend upon his own as well as his rival's assortment and the search costs. In addition, we provide conditions under which the retailers carry asymmetric assortment breadths in equilibrium.

This important book is by top scholars in supply chain management, revenue management, and e-commerce, all of which are grounded in information technologies and consumer demand research. The book looks at new selling techniques designed to reach the consumer.

This authoritative, comprehensive, and accessible volume by leading global experts provides a broad overview of marketing strategy issues and questions, including its evolution, competitor analysis, customer management, resource allocation, dynamics, branding, advertising, multichannel management, digital marketing and financial aspects of marketing. The Handbook comprises seven broad topics. Part I focuses on the conceptual and organizational aspects of marketing strategy while Part II deals with understanding competition. Customers and customer-based strategy, marketing strategy decisions, and branding and brand strategies are covered in the next three parts while Part VI looks at marketing strategy dynamics. The final part discusses the impact of marketing strategy on performance variables such as sales, market share, shareholder value and stakeholder value. All of the chapters in this Handbook offer in-depth analyses of research developments, provide frameworks for analyzing key issues, and highlight important unresolved problems in marketing strategy. Collectively, they provide a deep understanding of and key insights into the foundations, antecedents and consequences of marketing strategy. This compendium is an essential resource guide for researchers, doctoral students, practitioners, and consultants in the field of marketing strategy.

Customers often face multiple choices when purchasing a product or service. After making a choice, they sometimes have to wait for a while before receiving their purchased item due to the firm's limited capacityto process orders. This paper incorporates the anticipated wait for receiving purchased products or services into customers' choice behavior. The resulting choice model shares the same spirit of the rational expectation equilibrium, and captures the effects of negative externality caused by the anticipated wait, because all orders may be processed by a common facility. Our analysis shows that the anticipated wait may change the substitution patterns dramatically. We further investigate the effects of the anticipated wait on the decisions of capacity investment, product pricing and assortment planning. We establish the one-to-one mapping between the price vector and the choice probability vector, and show that the equivalent profit function of the choice probabilities is explicitly defined and more tractable. We characterize the multi-product price optimization problem under the MNL model with waiting. In addition to price competition, we also study the Cournot competition, in which the decision is the choice probability for each firm, and show that there exists a Nash equilibrium. For the assortment optimization, we identify the conditions under which the optimality of the revenue-ordered assortment still holds. Because the assortment problem with waiting is generally NP-hard, we develop efficient approximations with performance guarantee and also provide an easy-to-compute tight upper bound. The new model has the potential to increase prediction accuracy for customers' choice behavior especially when customers faced with multiple choices are aware of the possible waiting for their purchased products. Failure to take into account the effects of the anticipated wait in customers' purchase behavior may result in substantial losses to firms.

We study firms that sell multiple substitutable products and customers whose purchase behavior follows a Nested Logit model, of which the Multinomial Logit model is a special case. Customers make purchasing decision sequentially under the Nested Logit model: they first select a nest of products and subsequently purchase one within the selected nest. We consider the multi-product pricing problem under the general Nested Logit model with product-differentiated price sensitivities and arbitrary nest coefficients. We show that the adjusted markup, defined as price minus cost minus the reciprocal of price sensitivity, is constant for all products within a nest at optimality. This reduces the problem's dimension to a single variable per nest. We also show that the adjusted nest-level markup is nest-invariant for all the nests, which further reduces the problem to maximizing a single-variable unimodal function under mild conditions. We also use this result to simplify the oligopolistic multi-product price competition and characterize the Nash equilibrium. We also consider more general attraction functions that include the linear utility and the multiplicative competitive interaction models as special cases, and show that similar techniques can be used to significantly simplify the corresponding pricing problems.