This dissertation addresses optimal linear and nonlinear pricing policy design for a monopolistic network service provider with various types of public and private information on user types. In the communication network pricing literature, it is the linear pricing schemes that have been largely adopted, and here we investigate both linear and nonlinear pricing within the framework of a hierarchical Stackelberg (leader-follower) game, where the service provider sets prices for the resources (bandwidth) he offers as the leader, and the users respond by their choices of the amount of bandwidth (flow) they are willing to pay for. At the lower level, the presence of congestion cost (negative network effect) in the net utility functions of users leads to a noncooperative game among themselves, with Nash or Bayesian equilibrium being natural candidates for a solution. In the nonlinear pricing case, the approach is to view the problem as a reverse Stackelberg game, which is also an incentive-design problem. We also consider, for both linear and nonlinear pricing, three different scenarios based on the information sharing structure for all parties on the users' true types, namely complete information, partially incomplete information, and totally incomplete information. For each case, we obtain the optimal, or near-optimal, pricing policy that maximizes the service provider's profit given the noncooperative price-taking behavior of the users, generally for the asymptotic case regarding the number of users, since our focus is on communication networks with a large user population. Comparative studies between linear and nonlinear pricing, as well as between the three classes of informational scenarios, are carried out to evaluate profit improvement by adoption of nonlinear pricing and the service provider's game preferences.

This collection of selected contributions gives an account of recent developments in dynamic game theory and its applications, covering both theoretical advances and new applications of dynamic games in such areas as pursuit-evasion games, ecology, and economics. Written by experts in their respective disciplines, the chapters include stochastic and differential games; dynamic games and their applications in various areas, such as ecology and economics; pursuit-evasion games; and evolutionary game theory and applications. The work will serve as a state-of-the art account of recent advances in dynamic game theory and its applications for researchers, practitioners, and advanced students in applied mathematics, mathematical finance, and engineering.

This unified 2001 treatment of game theory focuses on finding state-of-the-art solutions to issues surrounding the next generation of wireless and communications networks. The key results and tools of game theory are covered, as are various real-world technologies and a wide range of techniques for modeling, design and analysis.

This brief guides the reader through three basic Internet resource pricing models using an Internet cost analysis. Addressing the evolution of service types, it presents several corresponding mechanisms which can ensure pricing implementation and resource allocation. The authors discuss utility optimization of network pricing methods in economics and underline two classes of pricing methods including system optimization and entities' strategic optimization. The brief closes with two examples of the newly proposed pricing strategy helping to solve the profit distribution problem brought by P2P free-riding and improve the pricing efficiency with the introduction of the price discrimination. The Internet resource pricing strategy is not only the key factor of Internet resource allocation efficiency, but also the determinant of the profit. The methods and models discussed in Internet Resource Pricing Models increase the efficiency of existing pricing strategies to ensure a sound and sustainable development of the Internet. The brief will help researchers and professionals working with this key factor of Internet resource allocation.

The two-volume set LNCS 4051 and LNCS 4052 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP 2006, held in Venice, Italy, July 2006. In all, these volumes present more 100 papers and lectures. Volume I (4051) presents 61 revised full papers together with 1 invited lecture, focusing on algorithms, automata, complexity and games, on topics including graph theory, quantum computing, and more.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Optimization and Applications, OPTIMA 2022, held in Petrovac, Montenegro, during September 26–30, 2022. The 17 full papers and presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 43 submissions. They were organized into the following as follows: mathematical programming; global optimization; discrete and combinatorial optimization; optimal control; optimization and data analysis; and game theory and mathematical economics.

Presenting state-of-the-art research into methods of wireless spectrum allocation based on game theory and mechanism design, this innovative and comprehensive book provides a strong foundation for the design of future wireless mechanisms and spectrum markets. Prominent researchers showcase a diverse range of novel insights and approaches to the increasing demand for limited spectrum resources, with a consistent emphasis on theoretical methods, analytical results and practical examples. Covering fundamental underlying principles, licensed spectrum sharing, opportunistic spectrum sharing, and wider technical and economic considerations, this singular book will be of interest to academic and industrial researchers, wireless industry practitioners, and regulators interested in the foundations of cutting-edge spectrum management.