These two volumes bring together a set of important essays that represent a "new Keynesian" perspective in economics today. This recent work shows how the Keynesian approach to economic fluctuations can be supported by rigorous microeconomic models of economic behavior. The essays are grouped in seven parts that cover costly price adjustment, staggering of wages and prices, imperfect competition, coordination failures, and the markets for labor, credit, and goods. An overall introduction, brief introductions to each of the parts, and a bibliography of additional papers in the field round out this valuable collection.Volume 1 focuses on how friction in price setting at the microeconomic level leads to nominal rigidity at the macroeconomic level, and on the macroeconomic consequences of imperfect competition, including aggregate demand externalities and multipliers. Volume 2 addresses recent research on non-Walrasian features of the labor, credit, and goods markets. Contributors George A Akerlof, Costas Azariadis, Laurence Ball, Ben S. Bernanke, Mark Bits, Olivier J. Blanchard, Alan S. Blinder, John Bryant, Andrew S. Caplin, Dennis W. Carlton, Stephen G. Cecchetti, Russell Cooper, Peter A. Diamond, Gary Fethke, Stanley Fischer, Robert E. Hall, Oliver Hart, Andrew John, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Alan B. Krueger, David M. Lilien, Ian M. McDonald, N. David Mankiw, Arthur M. Okun, Andres Policano, David Romer, Julio J. Rotemberg, Garth Saloner, Carl Shapiro, Andrei Shleifer, Robert M. Solow, Daniel F. Spulber, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lawrence H. Summers, John Taylor, Andrew Weiss, Michael Woodford, Janet L. Yellen

We show that modifying the standard neoclassical growth model by assuming that competition is imperfect makes it easier to explain the size of the declines in output and real wages that follow increases in the price of oil. Plausibly parameterized models of this type are able to mimic the response of output and real wages in the United States. The responses are particularly consistent with a model of implicit collusion where markups depend positively on the ratio of the expected present value of future profits to the current level of output.

The macroeconomics of imperect competition has become in recent years a most influential paradigm, which many macroeconomists now prefer to the Classical of Keynesian ones, notably because of its clear and rigorous microfoundations. This volume collects and puts into perspective the leading contributions to this important and rapidly expanding field.

New Keynesian models of price setting under monopolistic competition involve two kinds of inefficiency: the price level is too high because firms ignore an aggregate demand externality, and when there are costs of changing prices, price stickiness may be an equilibrium response to changes in nominal money even when all agents would be better off if all adjusted prices. This paper models the consequences of allowing firms to coordinate, enforcing the coordination by punishing deviators; this is equivalent to modeling firms as an implicit cartel playing a punishment game. We show that coordination can partially or fully eliminate the first kind of inefficiency, depending on the magnitude of the punishment, but cannot always remove the second. The response of prices to a monetary shock will depend on the magnitude of the punishment, and may be asymmetric. Implications for the welfare cost of fluctuations also differ from the standard monopolistic competition case

New keynesian economics/ed. by N. Gregory Mankiw.-v.1