"Daryl Copeland charts the course for a new kind of diplomacy, one in tune with the demands of today's interconnected, technology driven world. Eschewing platitudes and broadly rethinking issues of security and development, Copeland provides the tools needed to frame and manage issues ranging from climate change to pandemic disease to asymmetrical conflict and weapons of mass destruction. The essential keystone of his approach is the modern diplomat, able to nimbly engage with a plethora of new international actors and happier mixing with the population than mingling with colleagues inside embassy walls. Through the lens of Guerrilla Diplomacy, Copeland offers both a call to action and an alternative approach to understanding contemporary international relations"--Publisher's description.

In 1960 revolutionaries in South Viet Nam created the National Liberation Front, a political and military organization committed to overthrowing the Saigon government and liberating Viet Nam south of the seventeenth parallel. The role of the NLF during the war has been hotly debated, with officials in Washington claiming from the outset that the NLF was merely a puppet of Hanoi. Based on over a hundred interviews with former Communist cadre and high ranking Party officials as well as extensive archival research in Viet Nam, Robert K. Brigham's is a definitive work that provides a focus on the NLF not found elsewhere. It contributes greatly to our understanding of the Viet Nam War and encourages a reassessment of that conflict. Brigham assesses the impact of the NLF's diplomatic strategy on the conduct and outcome of hostilities, explores the origin and pursuit of its policy objectives, and defines its true relationship with North Viet Nam. He contends that the NLF's success in convincing the world that it was independent of Hanoi was critical in upsetting the political and military balance in South Viet Nam and frustrating the U.S. war effort. In addition, he argues that differences in goals among Communists—building socialism in the north, liberating the south—resulted in disagreements over responses to American intervention, and he shows how these differences entered into foreign relations and seriously undermined revolutionary efforts.

Diplomacy, development, and security in the age of globalization -- Cold War comfort: the world we knew -- Globalization and empire: the world we've got -- Understanding world order: the march of history -- Persistent insecurity: lessons unlearned -- Development revisited: no justice, no peace -- Science and technology: black hole or silver bullet? -- The global political economy of knowledge: working smarter -- The foreign ministry: relic or renaissance? -- Public diplomacy and foreign service: the front lines -- International policy instruments: relevant, effective, transformed -- Guerrilla diplomacy: sharper, faster, lighter -- Conclusion: none foregone.

A Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus, Kilcullen's vision of war dramatically influenced America's decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq. Now, Kilcullen provides a remarkably fresh perspective on the War on Terror.

A leading expert on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism offers a comprehensive theory of "competitive control" that will apply to the future of conflict in a world of explosive population growth, increased urbanization, the movement of population centers to the coasts, and global connective networks.

From South Carolina to South Vietnam, America's two hundred-year involvement in guerrilla warfare has been extensive and varied. America and Guerrilla Warfare analyzes conflicts in which Americans have participated in the role of, on the side of, or in opposition to guerrilla forces, providing a broad comparative and historical perspective on these types of engagements. Anthony James Joes examines nine case studies, ranging from the role of Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, in driving Cornwallis to Yorktown and eventual surrender to the U.S. support of Afghan rebels that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Empire. He analyzes the origins of each conflict, traces American involvement, and seeks patterns and deviations. Studying numerous campaigns, including ones staged by Confederate units during the Civil War, Joes reveals the combination of elements that can lead a nation to success in guerrilla warfare or doom it to failure. In a controversial interpretation, he suggests that valuable lessons were forgotten or ignored in Southeast Asia. The American experience in Vietnam was a debacle but, according to Joes, profoundly atypical of the country's overall experience with guerrilla warfare. He examines several twentieth-century conflicts that should have better prepared the country for Vietnam: the Philippines after 1898, Nicaragua in the 1920s, Greece in the late 1940s, and the Philippines again during the Huk War of 1946-1954. Later, during the long Salvadoran conflict of the 1980s, American leaders seemed to recall what they had learned from their experiences with this type of warfare. Guerrilla insurgencies did not end with the Cold War. As America faces recurring crises in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and possibly Asia, a comprehensive analysis of past guerrilla engagements is essential for today's policymakers.

Humanitarian professionals are on the front lines of today's internal armed conflicts, working with politicians and diplomats in countries wracked by violence, in capitals of donor governments that underwrite humanitarian work, as well as within the United Nations Security Council and providing information to the media. This publication sets out a compendium of essays written by 14 senior humanitarian practitioners who led humanitarian operations in settings as diverse as the Balkans and Nepal, Somalia and East Timor, and across a time frame from the 1970s in Cambodia and 1980s in Lebanon to more recent engagement in Colombia and Iraq.