As existing research, conferences and publications on wildland fire are oriented towards the technical aspects of prevention and firefighting, the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales et Communautaires (CERIC) and the Union regionale du sud-est pour la sauvegarde de la vie, de la nature et de l'environnement (URVN) decided to investigate the legal aspects of these matters, an equally important, but much less well-researched field, by organising a world conference in 1991 at Aix-en-Provence, France. This volume is the result of that conference. Experts from thirteen countries in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Europe particularly affected by wildland fires were brought together to discuss six controversial questions: - What should be the law concerning occupation and construction rights in forests? - Should swamping out take place and, if so, on what basis and with which objectives? - What are the essentials of organised firefighting? - Should replanting be carried out? - What indemnities should be available to the victims of fire? - What should be the penal sanctions? The Aix-en-Provence Charter adopted at the end of the Conference, and reproduced in this volume, brings together various principles concerning the above points, which could serve as a guide for national wildland fire policies worldwide.

During the five decades since its origin, law and economics has provided an influential framework for addressing a wide array of areas of law ranging from judicial behaviour to contracts. This book will reflects the first-ever forum for law and economics scholars to apply the analysis and methodologies of their field to the subject of wildfire. The only modern legal work on wildfire, the book brings together leading scholars to consider questions such as: How can public policy address the effects of climate change on wildfire, and wildfire on climate change? Are the environmental and fiscal costs of ex ante prevention measures justified? What are the appropriate levels of prevention and suppression responsibility borne by private, state, and federal actors? Can tort liability provide a solution for realigning the grossly distorted incentives that currently exist for private landowners and government firefighters? Do the existing incentives in wildfire institutions provide incentives for efficient private and collective action and how might they be improved?