This book delves into the intricate dynamics between economic elites and the political party system in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, particularly during their democratization phases in the twentieth century. It introduces a novel framework for comprehending the diverse political strategies adopted by these countries’ economic elites during this critical period. The central premise of this book is that the interplay between the cohesion of economic elites and the mobilization of popular sectors at specific historical junctures profoundly influences the nature of elite political involvement. While existing literature has extensively discussed the strategies employed by economic elites to safeguard their interests, this book takes a fresh approach by considering three primary configurations of relationships between economic elites and political parties. It explores cases where economic elites are the primary constituency of parties they have founded, as well as instances where upper-class interests are predominantly defended outside the party system through mechanisms such as the armed forces, pressure groups, and lobbying. Additionally, it examines scenarios where economic elites align themselves with parties boasting a polyclass constituency, exerting limited influence over these parties. This book goes beyond traditional analyses by proposing a theory that elucidates how the interaction between elite cohesion and popular sector mobilization determines the specific forms of elite political involvement. It also charts the historical sequences of this process, emphasizing the evolution of the causal relationship over time. To illustrate this theory, the book employs a comparative historical analysis, scrutinizing the three aforementioned cases to identify factors that account for the different forms of economic elite political participation. It discerns that the level of cohesion among economic elites and the degree of mobilization among popular sectors are pivotal factors shaping elite-party relationships.

Working from the basis of Arend Lijphart's 1968 work on divided societies, the authors go on to look at such cultures and subcultures thirty years on, bringing in new evidence and analysis to bear on the issue. They also examine the essential role of party politics within and between these ^D", framing comparisons with a number of countries from Belgium to Israel.

This book identifies sources of power that help business and economic elites influence policy decisions.

National-level elections receive more attention from scholars and the media than elections at other levels, even though in many European countries the importance of both regional and European levels of government has grown in recent years. The growing importance of multiple electoral arenas suggests that scholars should be cautious about examining single levels in isolation. Taking the multilevel structure of electoral politics seriously requires a re-examination of how the incentives created by electoral institutions affect the behaviour of voters and party elites. The standard approach to analysing multilevel elections is the second-order election (SOE) model, in which national elections are considered to be first-order elections while other elections are second order. However, this model does not provide micro mechanisms that determine how elections in one arena affect those in another, or explain variations in individual voting behaviour. The objective of this book is to explain how party and voter behaviour in a given election is affected by the existence of multiple electoral arenas. It provides original qualitative and quantitative data to examine European, national, and subnational elections in France, Germany, and Spain from 2011-2015. The volume examines party mobilization efforts across multiple electoral arenas, as well as decisions by individual voters with respect to turnout, strategic voting, and accountability. This book provides the first systematic analysis of multilevel electoral politics at three different levels across multiple countries. Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope, books in the series are characterised by a stress on comparative analysis and strong methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit: www.ecprnet.eu. The series is edited by Emilie van Haute, Professor of Political Science, Université libre de Bruxelles; Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy, Leuphana University; and Susan Scarrow, Chair of the Department of Political Science, University of Houston.

Problems associated with cronyism, corporatism, and policies that favor the elite over the masses have received increasing attention in recent years. Political Capitalism explains that what people often view as the result of corruption and unethical behavior are symptoms of a distinct system of political economy. The symptoms of political capitalism are often viewed as the result of government intervention in a market economy, or as attributes of a capitalist economy itself. Randall G. Holcombe combines well-established theories in economics and the social sciences to show that political capitalism is not a mixed economy, or government intervention in a market economy, or some intermediate step between capitalism and socialism. After developing the economic theory of political capitalism, Holcombe goes on to explain how changes in political ideology have facilitated the growth of political capitalism, and what can be done to redirect public policy back toward the public interest.

On cover & title page: Integrated project "Making democratic institutions work"