The international conferences held each year at Fordham University in New York provide the most definitive analysis of US & EEC Antitrust & Trade Law. These annual bound volumes of the proceedings furnish explanations of the myriad of US/EC structures, players & roles that impact on antitrust. The following volumes are available: 1986 United States & Common Market Antitrust Policies 1987 North American & Common Market Antitrust & Trade Law 1991 Practice of Law, Regulation, Ethnics & Liability 1992 EC & US Competition Law & Policy 1993 Antitrust in a Global Economy 1980-1991 Fordham Index of Tables of Cases

Bachelor Thesis from the year 2007 in the subject Business economics - Miscellaneous, grade: 94,0 %, International University of Monaco, 65 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: Objective of this thesis was to identify the trends and developments of country-specific defense strategies against hostile takeovers and their determinants. Thus, it was necessary to analyze which possibilities of corporate defense would actually be feasible in certain countries. Defense strategies were subdivided into preventive and ad-hoc strategies. National characteristics and differentiators were shown and analyzed regarding their suitability as a defense measure. Especially in France and Germany the big influential players have been in a process of change: banks and governments are pursuing different investment strategies and companies loose their "systematic protection". The example of Germany illustrates that companies are looking for protective alternatives as old structures like the Rhenish capitalism are breaking up. The growth of M&A activities, especially of hostile takeovers, has affected national legislation to tighten their regulations; France has lifted barriers regarding takeovers (both friendly and hostile) regarding 11 specific industries at the time being. This example illustrates the increasingly protectionist behavior in Europe on a governmental level. Corporate Governance generally takes shareholders more and more into consideration regarding the vote on the adoption of defense measures and golden parachutes. In the US, companies started to diminish golden parachutes as a result of the proposal of activist shareholders. In many European countries, however, there are still enough loopholes to avoid foregone shareholder voting. A contrary trend is to be seen in the US, where poison pills are diminished on a fast pace. In addition, shareholders vote increasingly in favor of declassified boards. Golden parachutes are still prevalent, but not

The market for corporate control had been the playfield of bust-up artists and speculators seeking short-time profits during the 1980s. This had also encouraged many innovations in the art of hostile takeover defence. Until today anti-takeover defence has reached a very sophisticated level and most companies have erected formidable defences to counter aggressive corporate raiders. With her book Jeanette Gorzala provides a global perspective on hostile take-over defence during the latest merger wave. The focus lies on firstly determining the most common anti-takeover defence strategies and then in a second step evaluating their effectiveness to ward off corporate raiders. For this purpose the underlying concepts of the formal theory are presented in order to serve as a fundamental basis for an empirical study. In order to underline the theory with empirical evidence a sample of 335 hostile takeover bids launched in the timeframe from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2008 has been analyzed. The key findings of the study are presented along two vital research questions reflecting the purpose of this book.

The United States and the United Kingdom are two countries sharing the same belief in the free market economy. Both countries are characterized by the separation of ownership and control and hostile takeovers are an important mechanism for constraining managerial excesses. However, the regulation of takeovers and defensive mechanisms is strikingly different. While Delaware jurisprudence has entrusted the board with the power to block hostile bids subject to an enhanced judicial standard, the United Kingdom has been a pioneer in adopting and promoting across Europe an absolute ban on takeover defenses. The public outrage provoked by the recent Kraft-Cadbury debacle has increased calls for stricter regulation of hostile takeovers. In light of the growing skepticism against the City Code's lenient approach to hostile takeovers, a question naturally arises. Should the United Kingdom abandon its restrictive approach towards takeover defenses and adopt the laxer and more lenient U.S. model? The answer should be negative, as the implementation of a U.S.-style regime, under which directors' defensive actions are scrutinized by the courts, would result in the U.K. market losing its major advantages. The speed, flexibility and certainty offered by the current regime would dissipate, should the authority in regulating defensive tactics be given to the courts. The genius of the U.K. regime lies in its ability to achieve the best results at a minimum cost. It manages to promote certainty, a vibrant takeover market and the accountability of directors, while eliminating the costs generated by litigation. In addition, the costs imposed by Rule 21 of the Takeover Code are either insignificant or associated with a wider debate outside the takeover field.

Essay from the year 2018 in the subject Business economics - General, grade: A, University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh Law School), course: Corporation Law and Economics, language: English, abstract: This essay examines the question whether allowing directors to implement anti-takeover defences is beneficial for all corporate constituencies. Beginning with the classification of the topic in the law and economics context of the market for corporate control in Chapter 2, I will briefly outline in Chapter 3 the scenarios in which anti-takeover defences usually come into operation, namely hostile takeovers. Chapter 4 presents the most common anti-takeover defences and sets out the legal framework to what extent directors are permitted to adopt such defences in accordance with the applicable law. A distinction is made between UK and US law, with the latter focussing on Delaware law, where more than a half of all US publicly traded corporations are established. The Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court have developed an extraordinary body of jurisprudence concerning corporate takeovers and anti-takeover defences. Chapter 5 points out potential impacts on the various constituencies of a company and deals with the fact why their interests have to be regarded in the takeover context. Finally, Chapter 6 critically evaluates anti-takeover defences from different stakeholder perspectives and concludes that these are not beneficial for all corporate constituencies, but for directors only.

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