Are public sector institutions being exposed to ever-greater oversight, audit and inspection in the name of efficiency, accountability and risk management? "Controlling Modern Government" explores the long-term development of controls over government across five major state traditions in developed democracies - US, Japan, variants of continental-European models, a Scandinavian case and variants of the Westminster model. A central aspect of the study is an eight country comparison of variety in the use of controls based in oversight, competition, mutuality and contrived randomness in the selected domains of the high bureaucracy at the core of the state, the higher education sector and the prison sector. Countries covered include Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the USA. Providing a comparison of trends in the last quarter century in control over public sector activities in OECD countries, this book will be invaluable reading for academics and graduate students focussing on political science and public administration, as well as policymakers in OECD countries.

This book examines the development of the theory and practice of constitutionalism, defined as a political system in which the coercive power of the state is controlled through a pluralistic distribution of political power. It explores the main venues of constitutional practice in ancient Athens, Republican Rome, Renaissance Venice, the Dutch Republic, seventeenth-century England, and eighteenth-century America. From its beginning in Polybius' interpretation of the classical concept of mixed government, the author traces the theory of constitutionalism through its late medieval appearance in the Conciliar Movement of church reform and in the Huguenot defense of minority rights. After noting its suppression with the emergence of the nation-state and the Bodinian doctrine of sovereignty, the author describes how constitutionalism was revived in the English conflict between king and Parliament in the early Stuart era, and how it has developed since then into the modern concept of constitutional democracy.

Some 30,000 public authorities control the most vital functions of the country. Yet they are answerable to no one. This groundbreaking book reveals how public authorities dominate local, state, and federal government--and the dangerous consequences when they run amok.

To the distinguished economic historian Jonathan Hughes, the ambiguous outcomes of attempted deregulation signal America's urgent need to probe the origins of our vast and chaotic maze of government economic controls. Why do government restrictions on the economy continue to proliferate, in spite of avowed efforts to allow the market a freer rein? How did this complicated network of nonmarket economic controls come about and whose purposes does it serve? How can we render such controls less destructive of productivity and wealth-creating activity? While exploring these questions, Jonathan Hughes updates his classic book The Governmental Habit to reflect the experience of what he calls the "wild ride" of the last fifteen years and to include a survey of new thinking about the problems of government intervention and control of economic life. Hughes's comprehensive work provides a narrative history of governmental involvement in the U.S. economy from the colonial period to the present, arguing convincingly that the "governmental habit" is deeply rooted in the country's past. In the lively and accessible style of the earlier book, The Governmental Habit Redux contends that modern American government is basically an enormous version of American colonial regimes. Changes in scale have transformed what was once an acceptable pattern into a conglomeration of inefficient and wasteful bureaucracies. Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Modern presidents are CEOs with broad powers over the federal government. The United States Constitution lays out three hypothetically equal branches of government--the executive, the legislative, and the judicial--but over the years, the president, as head of the executive branch, has emerged as the usually dominant political and administrative force at the federal level. In fact, Daniel Gitterman tells us, the president is, effectively, the CEO of an enormous federal bureaucracy. Using the unique legal authority delegated by thousands of laws, the ability to issue executive orders, and the capacity to shape how federal agencies write and enforce rules, the president calls the shots as to how the government is run on a daily basis. Modern presidents have, for example, used the power of the purchaser to require federal contractors to pay a minimum wage and to prohibit contracting with companies and contractors that knowingly employ unauthorized alien workers. Presidents and their staffs use specific tools, including executive orders and memoranda to agency heads, as instruments of control and influence over the government and the private sector. For more than a century, they have used these tools without violating the separation of powers. Calling the Shots demonstrates how each of these executive powers is a powerful weapon of coercion and redistribution in the president's political and policymaking arsenal.