. . . fascinating and thought provoking. Jan-Erik Lane, Public Management Review The central purpose of this book is to analyse the optimal allocation of local public goods or services (for example garbage collection, police, fire brigades and medical services) in large urban agglomerations and the allocation consequences of increasing competition in the provision of them. Competition in the Provision of Local Public Goods uses two innovative aspects present in the concept of Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions, which are de-localized membership and uni-functionality of jurisdictions. The book analyses the effect of these two aspects on competition among jurisdictions and the impact this probable increase in competition may have on the achievement of the optimal allocation of local public goods. The primary audience for this work is academics and researchers in the fields of urban and regional economics, location theory and public policy. An important secondary audience will be scholars of industrial organization, who can use the framework developed here for analyzing other problems related with the location of individuals in space.

Does political competition matter for public policies under conditions of imperfect elections and autocracy? Which mechanisms of accountability give better results in terms of social welfare under conditions of suppressed political competition? To answer these questions we use panel data covering 74 Russian regions for 2004-2009 and study how the intensity of political competition within legislative power affects efficiency of governors accountability' mechanisms. We show that in regions with a near monopoly of political power, increased administrative subordination of executives is associated with fewer public goods, specifically public education and public health care. By contrast, informal mechanisms of accountability for local executives (like networking) often work worse in heavily competitive environments. Moreover, we find evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between the intensity of political competition, the efficiency of accountability mechanisms, and some measures of public goods.

Every decision about energy involves its price and cost. The price of gasoline and the cost of buying from foreign producers; the price of nuclear and hydroelectricity and the costs to our ecosystems; the price of electricity from coal-fired plants and the cost to the atmosphere. Giving life to inventions, lifestyle changes, geopolitical shifts, and things in-between, energy economics is of high interest to Academia, Corporations and Governments. For economists, energy economics is one of three subdisciplines which, taken together, compose an economic approach to the exploitation and preservation of natural resources: energy economics, which focuses on energy-related subjects such as renewable energy, hydropower, nuclear power, and the political economy of energy resource economics, which covers subjects in land and water use, such as mining, fisheries, agriculture, and forests environmental economics, which takes a broader view of natural resources through economic concepts such as risk, valuation, regulation, and distribution Although the three are closely related, they are not often presented as an integrated whole. This Encyclopedia has done just that by unifying these fields into a high-quality and unique overview. The only reference work that codifies the relationships among the three subdisciplines: energy economics, resource economics and environmental economics. Understanding these relationships just became simpler! Nobel Prize Winning Editor-in-Chief (joint recipient 2007 Peace Prize), Jason Shogren, has demonstrated excellent team work again, by coordinating and steering his Editorial Board to produce a cohesive work that guides the user seamlessly through the diverse topics This work contains in equal parts information from and about business, academic, and government perspectives and is intended to serve as a tool for unifying and systematizing research and analysis in business, universities, and government

The Behavioral Economics of Climate Change: Adaptation Behaviors, Global Public Goods, Breakthrough Technologies, and Policy-Making shows readers how to understand mitigation strategies emerging from global warming policy discussions and the ways that changing climate conditions can alter these strategies. Through quantitative analyses, case studies and policy examples, this bottom-up approach to climate change economics gives readers the tools to create effective responses to global warming. This self-contained book on the topic covers key scientific and economic subjects in an applied, innovative and immediately relevant fashion. Unravels individual behaviors and national policies about global warming by evaluating their evolving motives and incentives Provides an economic analysis of the ways individuals makes decisions when faced with climate change Details a full range of alternative economic and policy responses, placing them in an integrated conceptual and policy framework

This paper asks, under what conditions can the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics be extended to economies with local public goods? We show that there are some fairly restrictive sets of assumptions under which a competitive local public goods equilibrium (if it exists) is efficient; more generally, however, competitive local public goods equilibria may be inefficient in the allocation of individuals among communities, in the number of communities, and in the level and kinds of public goods provided. The primary sources of inefficiency are identified and analyzed; these "market" failures are closely related to some important policy issues concerning, for instance, urban concentralization, fiscal decentralization, and regional redistribution. In communities in which landlords control the public sector, the level and kinds of public goods provided may be incorrect, and what goods are provided are supplied inefficiently. In contrast, in communities in which renters control the public sector, there are no incentives for efficiency in the supply of public goods. Because of what we refer to as rental capitalization, there may in fact be perverse incentives with respect to the kinds of public goods or "bads" provided. Not only is it the case that not every competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal, but not every Pareto efficient allocation can be sustained by a competitive local public goods equilibrium (with the appropriate lump sum redistributions) . Just as the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics does not adequately reflect the vices and virtues of competition in the market economy with purely private goods, so too here: the virtues of a decentralized mechanism for providing public goods may be vastly underestimated by our analysis