Although the corporate laws of the United States and the European Union have converged in recent decades, their respective laws regulating takeovers remain quite dissimilar. Under US law, directors have almost unfettered power in the takeover context and can implement powerful defenses to deter bidders. The broad grant of authority to US directors is diametrically opposite to the approach taken by the Takeover Directive due to the inclusion of, among other provision, the board neutrality rule. The difference in approach towards takeover regulation reflects philosophical differences about how to regulate the market for corporate control and how to define the interest of the company, and may have implications for the role of corporations in sustainable development. This paper describes in broad overview the US approach toward takeover regulation highlighting differences in approach between US law and the Takeover Directive. It suggests that US law allows but does not require directors to define company interest expansively so as to support the goal of sustainable development.

The European Directive on Takeover Bids of 2004 must be revised on the basis of experience gained in the five years of its application. On the basis of a legal and economic examination carried out by Marccus Partners and the Centre for European Policy Studies, the European Commission published an Application Report on 26 June 2012 on which the European Parliament in its Resolution of 21 May 2013 responded favorably. This has provoked very controversial economic and policy discussions in various Member States and beyond. This article carries out a comparative, theoretical and policy analysis of European takeover law, incorporating not only the Thirteenth Directive but also path dependent commonalities and differences between takeover law in the Member States as regards the European market for corporate control. The main point of dispute is the prohibition of frustrating action. The idea that the Board only takes account of the interests of the shareholders as regards defensive measures or an improved price (this with reference to the USA) is countered by the fear that the Board will have a serious self-interest in retaining their jobs and that this could affect their decisions and lead to their entrenchment (the position of the United Kingdom takeover regulation). It is argued that for path dependent reasons in Europe the market for corporate control has a role as a factor of external corporate governance. Takeovers do not only play a role in the allocation of resources with the consequence that capital is directed towards the place where it can be used most efficiently, but may also motivate Board members to perform better on behalf of shareholders (disciplinary mechanism). Even though there have been the improvements in (internal) corporate governance in recent decades, through the slowly growing role of institutional investors in the markets and in general meetings of shareholders, the progress has been rather limited. A functioning takeover market may still remain the most effective control mechanism.

Comparative Takeover Regulation compares the laws relating to takeovers in leading Asian economies and relates them to broader global developments. It is ideal for educational institutions that teach corporate law, corporate governance, and mergers and acquisitions, as well as for law firms, corporate counsel and other practitioners.

"This Master's Thesis is a comparative study of the regulation of defensive measures in hostile takeovers. It consists of two main parts: In the first, the subject is approached from a theoretical point of view. The relevant factors for the regulation of defensive measures are outlined and analysed, followed by a discussion of the different ways of drafting such rules. This part concludes with a proposition concerning the most favourable form and content of a regulation. The second part describes hostile takeover regulation in the US, the UK, Canada, the EU and Germany, showing the diversity in that field of regulation in practice and the underlying reasons. It highlights and assesses the characteristics of each country and its regulation in the light of the considerations made in the first part, and provides an outlook concerning the future development of the regulation of defensive measures in hostile takeovers." --