This fascinating book assesses Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz's famous theory on warfare in relation to historical and modern-day conflict—and future trends. Carl von Clausewitz's On War is arguably the most important single work ever written on the theory of warfare and military strategy. In Clausewitz Reconsidered, two prominent military historians assess his theories, examining their viability at a time when asymmetric warfare and "war" conducted by and against nonstate actors is increasingly common and state control often ephemeral. The basis of the book's analysis is an examination of war over the last four centuries, since the Thirty Years' War, including the Cold War and subsequent conflicts. What is discovered is that war is far more endemic and brutal today than when Clausewitz tried to explain it. This volume explores that paradox and shows that if anything, we can anticipate further uncontrolled violence. The authors conclude that Clausewitz and On War have assumed a status akin to holy writ, but are obviously dated. The aim of Clausewitz Reconsidered is to bring the master's theories up to date, providing the current generation with a new basis for thought and analysis.

This fascinating book assesses Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz's famous theory on warfare in relation to historical and modern-day conflict—and future trends. Carl von Clausewitz's On War is arguably the most important single work ever written on the theory of warfare and military strategy. In Clausewitz Reconsidered, two prominent military historians assess his theories, examining their viability at a time when asymmetric warfare and "war" conducted by and against nonstate actors is increasingly common and state control often ephemeral. The basis of the book's analysis is an examination of war over the last four centuries, since the Thirty Years' War, including the Cold War and subsequent conflicts. What is discovered is that war is far more endemic and brutal today than when Clausewitz tried to explain it. This volume explores that paradox and shows that if anything, we can anticipate further uncontrolled violence. The authors conclude that Clausewitz and On War have assumed a status akin to holy writ, but are obviously dated. The aim of Clausewitz Reconsidered is to bring the master's theories up to date, providing the current generation with a new basis for thought and analysis.

This fascinating book assesses Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz's famous theory on warfare in relation to historical and modern-day conflict--and future trends. Carl von Clausewitz's On War is arguably the most important single work ever written on the theory of warfare and military strategy. In Clausewitz Reconsidered, two prominent military historians assess his theories, examining their viability at a time when asymmetric warfare and "war" conducted by and against nonstate actors is increasingly common and state control often ephemeral. The basis of the book's analysis is an examination of war over the last four centuries, since the Thirty Years' War, including the Cold War and subsequent conflicts. What is discovered is that war is far more endemic and brutal today than when Clausewitz tried to explain it. This volume explores that paradox and shows that if anything, we can anticipate further uncontrolled violence. The authors conclude that Clausewitz and On War have assumed a status akin to holy writ, but are obviously dated. The aim of Clausewitz Reconsidered is to bring the master's theories up to date, providing the current generation with a new basis for thought and analysis.

For nearly two centuries, On War, by Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz (1780-1831), has been the bible for statesmen and military professionals, strategists, theorists, and historians concerned about armed conflict. The source of the famous aphorism that "war is an extension of politics by other means," it has been widely read and debated. But, as Jon Sumida shows in this daring new look at Clausewitz's magnum opus, its full meaning has eluded most readers-until now. Approaching Clausewitz's classic as if it were an encoded text, Sumida deciphers this cryptic masterwork and offers a more productive way of looking at the sources and evolution of its author's thought. Sumida argues that On War should be viewed as far more complete and coherent than has been supposed. Moreover, he challenges the notion that On War is an attempt to explain the nature of armed conflict through the formulation of abstract theories. Clausewitz's primary concern, Sumida contends, was practical instruction of the military and political leadership of his country. To achieve this end, Clausewitz invented a method of reenacting the psychological difficulties of high command in order to promote the powers of intuition that he believed were essential to effective strategic decision-making. In addition, Sumida argues that Clausewitz's primary strategic proposition is that the defense is a stronger form of war than the offense. This concept, Sumida maintains, must be understood in order to make sense of Clausewitz's positions on absolute and real war, guerrilla warfare, and the relationship of war and policy/politics. Sumida's pathbreaking critique is supported by examination of the Prussian officer's experience during the Napoleonic Wars, previous major theoretical and historical scholarship on Clausewitz and his writing, and modern philosophical and scientific works that have much in common with Clausewitz's creative guide to the consideration of strategic practice. A major study of intellectual and military history, Sumida's book provides a provocative and above all readily comprehensible treatment of a previously inaccessible classic. It will surely become essential reading for all military professionals and serious students of military thought.

While many scholars agree that Clausewitz's On War is frequently misunderstood, almost none have explored his methodology to see whether it might enhance our understanding of his concepts. This book lays out Clausewitz's methodology in a brisk and straightforward style. It then uses that as a basis for understanding his contributions to the ever growing body of knowledge of war. The specific contributions this study addresses are Clausewitz's theories concerning the nature of war, the relationship between war and politics, and several of the major principles of strategy he examined. These theories and principles lie at the heart of the current debates over the nature of contemporary conflict. They also underpin much of the instruction that prepares military and civilian leaders for their roles in the development and execution of military strategy. Thus, they are important even in circles where Clausewitz is only briefly studied. While understanding On War is no more a prerequisite for winning wars than knowledge is a requirement for exercising power, Clausewitz's opus has become something of an authoritative reference for those desiring to expand their knowledge of war. By linking method and concept, this book contributes significantly to that end.

Think about strategy and sharpen judgment in an unpredictable environment Carl von Clausewitz is widely acknowledged as one of the most important of the major strategic theorists; he's been read by Eisenhower, Kissinger, Patton, Chairman Mao, and numerous other leaders. In Clausewitz on Strategy, the Boston Consulting Group's Strategy Institute has excerpted those passages most relevant to business strategy from Clausewitz's classic text On War, the most general, applicable, and enduring work of strategy in the modern West and a source of insight into the nature of conflict, whether on the battlefield or in the boardroom. This book offers Clausewitz's framework for self-education--a way to train the reader's thinking. Clausewitz speaks the mind of the executive, revealing logic that those interested in strategic thinking and practice will find invaluable. He presents unique ideas, such as the idea that friction--unexpected interference--is an intrinsic part of strategy. The Boston Consulting Group is one of the world's leading management consulting firms whose clients include many of the world's industry leaders. Tiha von Ghyczy (Charlottesville, VA) has been a faculty member and Director of Business Projects at the Darden School of Business since 1996. While with The Boston Consulting Group, he assumed responsibility for the practice groups in manufacturing/time-based competition and high technology. He has published numerous articles and books on vision and strategy. Bolko von Oetinger (Munich, Germany) is a Senior Vice President of BCG. Christopher Bassford (Washington, DC) is presently a Professor of Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC, and the author of several books, including Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945.